The literature on European integration of the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on the process of economic and political institutionalization. European society has figured in this literature only as a factor furthering or slowing down these developments. At most, scholars have paid attention to what people thought about the process, always with an eye to whether citizens gave their consent or not to elite decisions, or have attempted to explain why consent has become relevant to the European integration process. This neglect of societal developments in Europe reflects in part the compartmentalization of the social sciences and the fact that European integration has been a topic mainly addressed by political scientists, economists, and legal experts, that is those most directly concerned by the institutionalization process of what is today the European Union. The recent institutionalist turn in studies of European integration has meant, however, that concepts and analytical tools borrowed from sociology have become part of this literature. This borrowing has created bridges between political science and sociology and motivated sociologists themselves to enter the field of European integration.
Some of them have made their own contributions to explaining the process of institutionalization, while others have started to explore topics neglected thus far by other disciplines. Thus, the 1990s witnessed the first comprehensive studies of European Union societies. Here I am mainly thinking of the work by Crouch, Rodríguez-Pose, Therborn, and Le Galès. The main novelty in these authors' studies is that they use Europe or the European Union rather than single states as the object of their descriptions of social structures or urban systems. What we still need, however, is an exploration of the ways in which the emerging institutional order in Europe has impacted on this society. That would be in my view the real object of a sociology of European integration. Recent work by people such as Berezin, Favell, Fligstein, Mérand, Guiraudon, Imig, Recchi, Tarrow, and Díez Medrano are motivated by this desire to bring European societies to the center of social scientific inquiry on the European Union. Katzenstein's recent book A World of Regions is also a rare exception in the IR literature for its concern on the impact of European integration and other regionalization processes on these regions' cultures. The timing of this interest in the societal impact of European integration is not random. The reason why it makes sense now and not in, let's say the 1960s, is that since 1986 what we now call the European Union has moved from being a customs union to becoming a single market with a common currency and institutions that cover a whole range of economic, social, and political policy areas. The new Europe Union has a tremendous impact on the European citizens' lives, whether they know it or not. The European Union is a multi-tiered polity, where government competences are distributed or shared by European, national, and subnational institutions. It is thus worth exploring what impact these dramatic institutional transformations have had on Europe's social structures rather than focus exclusively, as political scientists have done so far, on the impact of European social structures on the institutionalization process of the European Union.
I distinguish between two processes that presumably follow from the acceleration of European integration in the past 20 years. The first process is the Europeanization of national societies.
There are several definitions of Europeanization in the literature, which are difficult to harmonize. Generally, they refer to the European Union's impact on domestic politics and national economies. In this chapter I depart from this definition, proposing one that makes it akin to a regional version of globalization. I define Europeanization of national societies as a widening of the scope of the national citizens' economic and political activities that directly or indirectly result from the economic and political institutions of the European Union. The term bears similarities with Katzenstein's concept of "Internationalization", but applies to the European scenario only. The second process I examine is the emergence of a European society proper, one that transcends national and subnational affiliations. Whereas the Europeanization of national societies refers back to a network conceptualization of the social structure, the emergence of a European society refers back to stratification and cultural conceptualizations of social structure. The focus here is on the emergence of European social groups, that is, transnational groups of European citizens whose consciousness and behavior denote solidarities that transcend national and subnational affiliations. My approach combines Marxist and Weberian conceptions of class. Like Marx, I distinguish between the concepts of class in itself and class for itself and focus on the identity/consciousness dimension of class. Like Weber, I distinguish between the concepts of class position and social class and focus on the interaction aspects of the latter: whereas class position is primarily defined in terms of objective opportunities in the market, social class involves the development of intense interaction between the members of a group (Bourdieu adds to this conceptualization of social class a "distinction" dimension, which refers to taste or what one can broadly define as consumption patterns).
Identification with the group, intermarriage, joint political action, distinct consumption patterns, and social closure strategies are some of the dimensions one needs to explore when studying the emergence of a European society. Logically speaking, we would expect Europeanization to proceed faster than the emergence of a European society, since the former is a precondition of the latter. Indeed, Europeanization brings tourists, exchange students, migrant workers, readers, listeners, participants to Conferences, firms, and political claimants from different countries in contact. Without these contacts, the solidarities that constitute social groups could not develop.
This chapter, in the spirit of promoting a sociological research agenda on European integration, examines how far along we are in the development of these solidarities. Furthermore, relying on the literature on the development of nations and classes, I outline the main obstacles to the emergence of a European society. I argue that contrary to what a Deutschian approach would propose, the main obstacles to the emergence of a European society have less to do with the limited scope and intensity of intra-European transactions than with the politically decentralized character of the European Union and with the fact that the European Union has until now been spared a military confrontation with an external enemy. I conclude with two reflections: one on the prospects for a development of a European society and another related one on the current European Union crisis.
1-Europeanization
Since 1986, the European Union has made tremendous strides toward the development of a single market, through the elimination of the numerous non-tariff barriers that existed to the free movement of goods, capital, and people. Today, one can say that there is a European Union single market for goods and a quasi-single market for capital and labor. I say a quasi-single market for capital because the non-harmonization of property rights across the European Union and informal barriers created by state governments makes some markets-i.e. the British-more open than others. A recent illustration of the remaining obstacles have been the decisions taken by the Spanish, Italian, and French governments, to prevent take-overs in the energy and banking sectors by other European corporations. It is a quasi-single market for labor because many informal obstacles exist to the movement of workers, as illustrated in Favell's ethnographic work on "free-movers" (2008) . Among them, the lack of transparency in information on the availability of jobs, bureaucratic slowness in the recognition of qualification credentials in sectors where these are required, subtle forms of discrimination by national origin when hiring workers, informal forms of discrimination toward citizens from other EU member states when they look for housing or try to open bank accounts, misunderstanding of EU legislation by national bureaucracies, which leads to double taxation of those moving from one country to another or to the wrong administrative requirements, and lack of clarity with respect to the transportability of pension benefits. I would finally mention, the barriers to mobility created by clientelistic hiring practices in many European countries. Despite the shortcomings listed above one must admit that in the last twenty years there has been considerable momentum toward the creation of a single market. Parallel to this transformation, there has been a Europeanization of trade, investment, and labor markets. European Union member states trade much more with each other and depend more on trade with each other, not only in absolute terms, but also as a proportion of their total trade, than they did twenty years ago. Also, the number of European mergers and take-overs by other European Union corporations has increased quite substantially in the 1990s. This is reflected among others in an increase in the Europeanization of boards of directors. Kentor and Jank show for instance that between 1983 and 1998 the number of intra-European interlocking directorates per firm for European firms included in Fortune's Global 500 went from 0.18 to 0.51. The authors focus on global interlocking and thus do not provide detailed information on the Europeanization of firms in specific countries. Nonetheless, they show that firms from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany are the most global, closely followed by French and British firms, in that order (Table   1) Thus far, I have mainly focused on the Europeanization of member states' societies resulting from the European Union's policies to create a single market and to encourage cross-national contact between the citizens of its member states. In the last 20 years, the European Union has also considerably expanded its range of competences and the budgetary resources at its disposal.
It has moved from being a mere customs union with a small budget almost entirely spent on the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to legislate on a wide variety of policy areas and to have a larger budget that can be used to fund a wide array of projects and activities. Furthermore, in the last twenty years the concept of the primacy of European Union law over national law has been firmly established. As the European Union has broadened its legislation and policymaking capacity, as its budget has increased and diversified, a growing number of social groups in the European Union states have developed stakes in the decisions of the European Union. It is no longer exclusively farmers. Workers, employers, consumers, researchers, residents in relatively poor regions, are increasingly affected. This significant increase in the political scope of the European Union has translated into a Europeanization of claims-making (see Imig and Tarrow, 2001 ). This Europeanization of claims-making means that an increasing number of citizens, interest groups, and social movements are addressing their claims to the European Union institutions (Table 2 ). It also means that an increasing number of groups, associations, social movements organizations, and lobbies are being formed, whose main goal is to impact on the European Union's decision-making process. The European Union itself has encouraged the formation of these network of associations, especially when they have a cross-national or European character.
In sum, there is a clear relationship between the strengthening of the European Union's economic and political institutions since the late 1980s and the Europeanization of the national societies, whether we think of exchanges, experiences, and political mobilization. But this Europeanization does not necessarily involve the emergence of a European society. When people exchange goods and invest capital in other European countries, when they sit in boards of directors in firms from different European countries, when they visit other European countries as tourists or exchange students, when they move to other European countries in order to work, when they join Europeanwide associations, when they address claims to the European Union institutions, they do not necessarily do it as members of an emergent European society.
Nothing prevents them from doing it as Spaniards, French, English, or Czech citizens. Indeed, as I show and explain below, few do so as members of a European class or group, and while Europeanization is a first step toward the emergence of a European society, the latter will not necessarily follow from a further intensification of the Europeanization process. Further changes would be necessary for a new, European society, to emerge.
2-A European Society?
The sociological literature has assigned at least four meanings to the concept of social structure: 1) a system of institutions, 2) a system of stratification, with class as its main dimension, 3) a network configuration, and 4) a cultural system, with culture encompassing values, norms, beliefs, identities and taken-for-granted behavioral rules that differentially empower social actors. Seen from these perspectives, the study of the Europeanization process only corresponds to a weak-ties network conceptualization of the social structure. Both the stratification and the cultural conceptions of the social structure, however, demand that we focus on strong ties and on identity respectively when discussing the existence of a European society. This is particularly true if we consider both Marxist and Weberian contributions to the study of social structure. The European society that would interest Marx and Weber is not the one systematically examined by authors like Crouch, that is, a European society constructed on the basis of the aggregation of national statistics on occupational or sectoral distributions of the European labor force. It stands a level above this statistical construction. Both Marx and Weber see identity as a core constitutive element of a class. Thus, Marx distinguishes between a class "an sich" and a class "für sich", whereas Weber distinguishes between social position and social class, with the latter including a dense network of deep interaction that surely translates into group identity. Consequently, a Marxist and a Weberian understanding of class demand that we focus on three constitutive dimensions of a European social group in order to draw conclusions about the existence of a European society (Figure 1 ). One of them is the consciousness of being European, that is, identification with a society called Europe. A second one is the existence of strong ties between those who identify as European. In the study of the upper classes, intermarriage has generally been considered the ultimate indicator of such strong ties, not only because of the emotional element involved but also because it generally represents a form of capital merger, at least from the heirs perspective. Cold joint ownership of capital, that is, co-ownership without a deep emotional component, is another good indicator of strong ties. A third element in social groups as defined here is joint purpose and, more specifically, joint political action. Undoubtedly, a pre-condition for a social group to be appropriately described as European is that its members see themselves this way. The two behavioral elements, direct or marriage-mediated capital merger and joint political action, help to describe the strength of the European sense of membership, with joint political action expressing a greater degree of solidarity than joint membership in an European voluntary association, such as a European bowling club. A fourth element of social groups not so much defines them as generally follows from their existence. This is the development among its members of shared consumption practices as they compete for symbolic capital with other social groups.
It is easy to see how Europeanization is a pre-requisite for the emergence of European social groups. Europeanization means contact, direct or virtual, and without such contact it is difficult to see how people from different European countries would intermarry, merge capital in practices of co-ownership, or come to see themselves as Europeans. Europeanization also includes the creation of voluntary Europeanwide associations that with time have the potential to become so cohesive as to become the foundation for European politicized mobilization.
What evidence do we have to talk of a European society? What has been the impact of the political and economic institutional developments of the past few decades in the European Union on the emergence of a European society? Very little indeed, which is good for sociologists, for it means that there are ample opportunities for research. Fortunately, we have good information on the prevalence of a sense of identification with Europe among the population. This information, collected with some regularity through the Eurobarometer and other surveys provides conclusive evidence that the transformations of the European Union in the last twenty years and the Europeanization of national societies have had no impact whatsoever on the degree of identification with Europe by European citizens. The degree of identification with Europe has remained more or less constant through these years of European integration and of concomitant Europeanization (Table 3) The data just discussed show a vast contrast between levels of identification with and attachment to the European Union and levels of identification with and attachment to the state in even the most plurinational states in Europe. Nonetheless, the fact that more than half of Europeans express some form of identification with Europe, even if usually secondary to the national or regional identifications, is indicative of a proto-European society layered over national and subnational societies. Whether it actualizes as a full-fledged society or not remains to be seen. The 10% or so citizens who identify more with Europe than with their nation and who at the same time feel close or very close to the European Union would form the core of this society. Ten percent is probably the upper boundary of EU citizens whom one could call Europeans. The literature has shown that younger, more educated citizens, and the upper echelons of the salaried work force are more prone to identify as Europeans than the rest of the citizens. The contrasts, however, between different social categories of individuals are not spectacular. This is by itself an indication that the concept of identification with Europe is not very salient in people's minds. Still, all theoretical perspectives on the topic of identification expect the above mentioned groups to represent the forerunners of European society, just as the middle classes were the first ones to develop a sense of identification with the nation, back in the late 19 th century. Meaningfully interpreting these data is extremely complex and beyond this chapter's scope. At the very least, however, is that geographic mobility makes intermarriage between Europeans possible. In the absence of studies on intermarriage we may thus examine what mobility data tell us about the development of a scenario where these marriages become more frequent.
Mobility rates were low but rising in the fifteen old members of the European Union. The accession of twelve new members has been followed by a new East-West migration wave, which will certainly increase the opportunities for intermarriage between Europeans. The migration that interests us, however, is that of what Favell labels "free movers", that is high skilled workers whose motivations for moving are not exclusively economic and certainly not political. The mobility rates of this group of European citizens are particularly interesting because their sociodemographic characteristics are similar to those of the citizens who most frequently identify as Europeans. The problem is that mobility rates by free-movers are difficult to measure because many do not register as residents (see Favell, 2008) . Survey data on mobility intentions offer an indication, however, of trends among the population. The data I present here come from Spain, a country where because of relatively low income per capita one would expect more people to seize on the opportunities created by the European single market. These data on investment patterns suggest that a European capitalist class is emerging in the densely populated and capital-rich areas at the intersection of Germany and the Low Countries.
It is not surprising that it is precisely in this geographical area where one finds the largest percentages of citizens identifying themselves as Europeans. In Belgium and West Germany, about 17% and 16% of the citizens respectively identify primarily as European, compared with about 10% for the European Union as a whole (Figure 2 ). Imig points out, despite the simultaneous character of mobilization, despite the similarity in the tactics employed, many instances of coordinated mobilization simply reflect the juxtaposition of domestic national interests rather than European interests proper (Imig, 2002) . The kinds of actors who mobilize in this fashion actually represent the citizens who least identify with Europe in the European Union, that is, farmers and workers.
The examination of the organization and activities of interest groups does not provide a glossier picture with respect to the development of a European society. I will first focus on employers.
In dealing with the European Union, employers have followed different strategies: 1) formed or European segments of the national bourgeoisies may first develop as imagined communities, before they start coming into contact, driven by the common taste, through travel, student exchanges, work, or residence abroad, and begin to coalesce into a European class "für sich". A sociological agenda on European integration would include the investigation of the extent to which this split between local and European segments of national bourgeoisies is indeed happening.
3-Explanations
How do we explain the sluggishness in the development of a European society relative to the rapid Europeanization of behavior and experience?
The few scholars who have discussed the topic use Deutsch's work as their inspiration.
Transactionalism predicts that a common identity will result from the intensification of contact, communication, and transactions among Europeans (provided this intensification proceeds faster at the European than at the national or other subnational levels). While Europeanization is an essential precondition for the development of a European society, both theoretical considerations and empirical data question that it play the central role. In other words, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the Europeanization of economic and political behavior and of experiences (e.g. travel, studying) will lead to the emergence of social groups that one can call "European". From an empirical perspective, I have already shown that Europeanization in the past twenty years has had a negligeable impact on the proportion of citizens who identify themselves as European. In fact, data show that Swiss and Norwegians, both from countries outside the European Union, express the same level of identification with Europe as the average EU citizen. From a theoretical perspective, to solely rely on transactionalism means to disregard the voluminous literature on national identity formation over the past twenty-five years. This literature points out that national building was more a top-down process than a bottom-up one (Eg. Gellner, 1983 , Weber, 1981 Breuilly, 1986; Hobsbawm, 1989) . While discursive networks and other forms of interaction may have contributed to the development of an imagined community among the literate, it was institutions created by an expanding state in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Europe that began to integrate the average man and woman in these national imagined communities. I am referring to institutions such as the school and the army. As Eugen Weber puts it, it was the universalization of primary education and of conscription that turned "peasants" into "Frenchmen" (1983) . In the contemporary world, political messages transmitted by the media have become the main vehicle for the transmission of national identities.
Recently, scholars sensitive to the existence of hierarchically nested identities have complemented the top-down perspective pioneered by Weber. Thus, in 1992 Edward Lawler made a very powerful argument to the effect that people identify most with those units on which individuals depend the most for their security. Decentralization processes whether in industry or in polities do not enhance people's attachment to the broader identity; on the contrary, they strengthen the local or narrower identities around which the decentralization processes are built because they increase the individuals' dependence on the security provided by those narrower units. Finally, historians of Britain and of other countries have highlighted the decisive role played by wars in the development of negative forms of identity, that is identities based on that which differentiates a group from other groups rather than on that which unites its members.
Cooley (1991), for instance, stresses the crucial role played by war with France in the 18 th and 19 th centuries in the formation of British identity.
When we focus on the role of political institutions, on the role of relative security provision, and on war as a nation-building mechanism we begin to understand why despite a dramatic intensification of transactions in the last couple of decades, there has been little change in the degree to which citizens identify with Europe. First of all, state and national political elites are still in direct or indirect control of the main socialization agencies. Education remains a national or regional competence and, consequently, the geography and history curriculum in most countries are still predominantly national ones. My examination of secondary school British, German, and Spanish history textbooks since the 1940s showed that this is indeed so and that when these textbooks concentrate on extra-national geographical areas these tend to be former colonies, as in Spain or Great Britain (2003) . Furthermore, in many countries recent trends have gone in the direction of emphasizing subnational history or geography rather than European ones. True, a bottom-up process is under way, the Bologna process, toward homogenizing systems of higher education. This homogenization has to do, however, with the duration and credit requirements of the undergraduate and graduate curricula.
Second of all, the media remain national media, which give privileged access to national political actors over European Union actors. Data from the Europub.com project show that there has been no change whatsoever in the presence of European Union actors as claimants in the 1990s (Table 4 ). This contrasts with the Europeanization in claims-making that took place in the same period, as national actors addressed the European Union with increasing frequency.
In other words, the media increasingly report claims address to the EU but there has been no change in the frequency with which the media report claims made by European Union actors.
The "nation-building" capacity of the European Union through the media has thus remained constant in the 1990s.
In sum, the main nation-building institutions in today's Europe, the school and the media, remain national and focused on the state and regional levels.
When we focus on the sources of material security for European Union citizens, we see that the state and, sometimes, the regions are still responsible for those. It is indeed the state and the regions which provide public education, unemployment benefits, pensions, health insurance, housing allowances, etc…The population in fact opposes the transfer of these functions to the European Union, thus preventing European institutions from seizing control over a major mechanism for the creation of a European identity 2 . The European Union has certainly increased its role in the provision of security to European citizens, mainly through the structural and cohesion funds. Research that Mabel Berezin and I have conducted on the role of distance in support for European integration demonstrates that these structural and cohesion funds are associated with strong support for European integration in Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland (Berezin and Díez Medrano, forthcoming) . In the 1990s, Ireland moved from being one of the poorest states in Europe to becoming one of the wealthiest. Simultaneously, its citizens moved from being among those opposing European integration the most to becoming enthusiastic supporters. Our analysis shows, however, that these fund transfers have no impact on the level of attachment to Europe, not even in Ireland. One could interpret these results as indicative that the funds are not generous enough to offset the sense of security that citizens derive from the state to which they belong. After all, in the best of cases, namely Spain, they have represented only a tiny percentage of the GDP.
The discussion above therefore suggests that the lack of development of a European group identity in the European Union is consistent with theoretical predictions and supports more the would be the topic of another essay (see Díez Medrano, forthcoming). I will simply raise a few considerations: First of all, survey research provides ample evidence to demonstrate that the degree of identification with Europe is only one factor among many explaining support for European integration. It can affect the kinds (structures) and intensity of conflict over the constitution of the European Union but hardly be the decisive factor (Hooghe and Marks, 2005) .
In fact, the citizens' level of education, age, occupation, political leanings, subjective economic appraisals, trust in EU institutions, subjective feelings of efficacy, and country of residence are all factors that impact on support for European integration net of their degree of identification with Europe. Secondly, European citizens consistently express support for transfers of sovereignty in key areas like foreign policy while political leaders behave as if they did not hear, undertaking instead steps toward integration in areas where support is much weaker, whether we speak of the single currency or enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.
Citizens of the European Union, despite their primary national-and even regional--identifications, generally like that their country is part of this project. In this sense, they behave more like Habermas's constitutional patriots than like old-fashioned nationalists. The citizens' occasional rejection of reform projects reflects the fact that, contrary to what happened before Maastricht, they are often asked to express their opinion in referenda and, also, the fact that their European project does not exactly coincide with that of their political leaders. The French and 
